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Abstract 
 
 
Many empirical studies document the value effect. One explanation is that 
investors overreact to growth aspects for growth stocks. We apply Stein's (1989) method 
to investigate whether the degree of overreaction differs between value and growth stocks 
using the implied volatility from option prices. A finding of overreaction for either value 
stocks or growth stocks would lend support to overreaction as an explanation for the 
value effect. Empirical results here indicate a stronger degree of overreaction for growth 
stocks.  
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Is Overreaction an Explanation for the Value Effect? A Study Using Implied 
Volatility from Option Prices 
 
I. Introduction 
Many empirical studies indicate that value stocks outperform growth 
stocks in the long term, either measured by total return or risk-adjusted return 
(e.g., Fama and French. (1992, 1996); Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1994); 
Bauman and Miller, (1997)). The explanations for the value stock effect however 
are not clear. Efficient market arguments (e.g., Fama and French, (1992)) suggest 
that small firms with low price-to-book ratio may be riskier and as a result 
command higher risk premium. On the other hand, the rationale behind value 
investing is that investors overreact to lack of growth opportunities for value 
stocks and/or they overreact to growth prospects for growth stocks (e.g., Graham 
(1962)); consequently value stocks may be under-priced while growth stocks 
over-priced. The issue has important implications for individual investors as well 
as institutional ones. For instance, Morningstar classifies mutual funds’ 
investment styles into value or growth and small or large oriented. This study 
attempts to shed light on the overreaction explanation for the price-to-book effect 
by using the methodology first proposed by Stein (1989). 
Stein (1989) analyzes the term structure of options’ implied volatility to 
infer the degree of investor overreaction. Intuitively, if stock prices have a 
tendency to return to their long-term mean, long-term investors revise their 
expectations for future volatility to a smaller extent than their short-term 
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counterparts. The expectation for future volatility can be inferred from option 
prices, commonly referred to as implied volatility. Therefore, implied volatility is 
the current consensus of anticipated future volatility by market participants and it 
reflects the market sentiment for the underlying security. Stein’s (1989) empirical 
results using S&P 100 index options show that implied volatility for long-term 
options moves almost in lockstep with short-term options, thereby suggesting 
overreactions. However, Diz and Finucane (1993) and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst 
(1994) show that the degree of overreaction is sensitive to statistical specifications 
and assumptions about the underlying stock return generating process.  
This paper applies Stein’s (1989) method to investigate whether the degree 
of overreaction differs between value and growth stocks. To the authors’ 
knowledge, there is no similar research on this issue. One study that is somewhat 
related is the one by La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997). They 
examine stock price reactions to earnings announcements and conclude that a 
significant portion (roughly one third of the first two years) of the return 
difference between value and growth stocks is explained by systematically more 
positive earnings surprises for value stocks. Bauman and Miller (1997) document 
similar findings. However, none of these studies directly infer investors’ 
expectations. 
A finding of overreaction for either value stocks or growth stocks could 
lend support to overreaction as an explanation for the value stock effect. Absence 
of overreaction could be interpreted as evidence that investors in various types of 
stocks are not fundamentally different, which is plausible considering that 
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institutional investors hold a large portion of shares and are fairly diversified. The 
focus here is whether the degree of overreaction differs between value and growth 
stocks. Unless measurement problems are more severe for a particular group of 
stocks, these problems as indicated by Diz and Finucane (1993) and Heynen, 
Kemna, and Vorst (1994) would have little effect on the results here. Moreover, 
this study estimates implied volatility for individual stocks, as opposed to 
previous studies that use index options. The use of individual stocks allows for a 
richer set of testing. This paper assumes bull and bear markets separately as the 
implied volatility changes may vary across up and down markets.  
 
II. Relevant Literature 
 
II. 1 Value Stock Effect 
Fama and French, (1992, 1996), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1994) 
and Bauman and Miller (1997) document that value stocks produce higher returns 
than growth stocks in the U.S. stock market. Recently Beneda (2002) examines 
the performance of growth versus value stock portfolios created during the period 
1983-1987. Consistent with prior studies, the five-year returns of value stocks 
exceed those of growth stocks. However, the long-term buy-and-hold returns (up 
to 18 years) of growth stocks are higher than those of value stocks for portfolios 
created during the years included in the study. Nevertheless, it is likely that, after 
a five-year run-up, some value stocks would be classified as growth stocks. 
Furthermore, her time period mainly covers 1990s, a period when growth stocks 
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perform exceptionally well. The stock returns are not adjusted for market returns 
as well. 
In addition to the considerable empirical research for the U.S. stock 
market, some studies compare the performances of value and growth stocks in the 
stock markets in other countries. Value and growth stocks may perform 
differently in non-U.S. markets because of the variations in investors’ behavior 
and/or market conditions. For example, Bauman (1996) observes that the 
availability, quality, and timeliness of research information vary substantially 
from one country to another. Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe (1993), using price-to-
book ratios (P/Bs), find that value stocks outperformed growth stocks in France, 
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom in the 1981-1992 period. Fama and 
French (1998) conclude that value stocks tend to have higher returns than growth 
stocks in 12 of 13 major markets during 1975-1995 period and the difference 
between average returns on global portfolios of high and low book-to-market 
stocks is 7.6% per year. 
Researchers have offered two primary explanations for the performance 
difference. Fama and French (1992, 1996) suggest that price-to-book and firm 
size may proxy for risk. Thus the fact that value stocks might be considerably 
riskier than growth stocks account for their superior return. However, Fama and 
French (1992) find evidence to the contrary - stocks with low price to book value 
ratios are characterized by lower betas. If beta represents the systematic risk of a 
stock, value stocks with low price to book ratios are supposed to have higher beta 
than growth stocks.  
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Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that investors erroneously 
extrapolate past earnings growth too far into the future and therefore cause stock 
prices to deviate from their 'fundamental' value.  Future earnings of firms that 
recently performed badly - more likely to be relatively small and have a high 
book-to-market ratio - are underestimated, whereas growth stocks or large stocks 
are overestimated. Based on the stock price reactions around earnings 
announcement for value and growth stocks over a five-year period after portfolio 
formation, La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that a 
significant portion of return difference between value and growth stocks is 
attributable to earnings surprises that are systematically more positive for value 
stock, which is inconsistent with a risk-based explanation for the return 
differential. Instead, they argue that value stocks have been underpriced relative 
to their risk and return characteristics. Bauman and Miller (1997) enhance the 
argument by showing that investment research analysts systematically 
overestimate the future earning per share (EPS) of growth stocks relative to value 
stocks; as a result, growth stocks experience lower returns subsequently when 
realized EPS growth rates are disappointingly lower than those that were 
expected.1 
  The greater information asymmetry inherited in growth stocks can make 
growth stocks sensitive to changes in investor sentiment. Copeland and Copeland 
(1999) suggest an investing strategy that involves switching between value stocks 
and growth stocks. When the estimate of expected future volatility goes up, the 
                                                 
1 Bauman and Miller (1997) observe that the EPS growth rate has a mean-reversion tendency, over 
time, in which the high growth rates associated with growth stocks subsequently tend to decline 
whereas the low growth rates associated with value stocks tend to increase.  
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rising uncertainty about the future might lead to falling confidence in growth 
stocks and investors shift into value stocks. When the estimated future volatility 
goes down, investors are likely to shift into growth stocks on the assumption that 
decreases in expected volatility signal rising confidence in the future, a condition 
that favors growth stocks. They find evidence supporting the effectiveness of the 
strategy. 
 
II. 2 Term Structure of Implied Volatility 
  Stein (1989) examines the term structure of implied volatilities, using two 
daily time series on implied volatilities for S&P 100 index options over the period 
from December 1983 to September 1987. Based on the assumption that the 
volatility follows a mean reverting process with a constant long-run mean and a 
constant coefficient of mean reversion, changes in long-term implied volatility 
should be less than those of short-terms. Instead, he finds that implied volatility of 
long-term and short-term options move almost in perfect lockstep. That is, the 
correlation between long-term and short-term implied volatility is close to one. 
Therefore, he concludes that this presents evidence for overreaction. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion has been disputed by Diz and Finucane 
(1993) and Heynen, Kemna, and Vorst (1994). Diz and Finucane (1993) indicate 
that the relation between long and short options cannot be constant. They use 
changes in implied volatility as opposed to the level of implied volatility and find 
no evidence for overreactions for S&P 100 stock in dex. Heynen, Kemna, and 
Vorst (1994) utilize one year’s data on the European Option Exchange and the 
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Amsterdam Stock Exchange. They test restrictions on implied volatilities under 
mean reverting model, GARCH model and EGARCH model and find that their 
conclusion about overreaction depends on the model specifying the process of 
price volatility. EGARCH model gives the best description of asset prices and the 
term structure of options’ implied volatilities and indicates no overreaction. On 
the other hand, assuming mean reverting and GARCH models, the evidence is in 
favor of overreaction. Nevertheless, they find that none of the models is 
misspecified, as a result they cannot reach defined conclusions on whether 
investors overereact to information. Poteshman (2001) examines whether the 
long-horizon overreaction documented by Stein (1989) in the OEX market is 
present in the S&P 500 (SPX) index options market in a later period. Employing a 
standard variance model, he separates daily changes in instantaneous variance 
into expected and unexpected parts and assumes investors respond to the 
unexpected part when they set option prices. The evidence indicates that SPX 
options market investors underreact to daily information and overreact to 
extended periods of mostly similar daily information and exhibit increasing 
misreaction to daily information as a function of the quantity of previous similar 
information. 
  In summary, the empirical results on the term structure of implied 
volatility of options are mixed and the underlying reasons for the different 
performance between growth stock and value stocks still remain an open question. 
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III. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses: 
 
Stein (1989) assumes that instantaneous volatility σt evolves according to 
continuous-time mean reverting AR1 process as follows. 
(Equation 1)  
dzdtd ttt βσσσασ +−−= )(   
   
At time t, the expectation of volatility as of time t+j is given by 
(Equation 2)  
)()( σσρσσ −+=+ tjjttE  
Where ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient of implied volatility of short term stock 
options at a one-day lag. . That is, volatility is expected to decay 
geometrically back towards its long-run mean level of 
1<= −αρ e
σ .  
Denoted by Vt(T), the implied volatility at time t on an option with T 
remaining until expiration should equal to the averaged expected instantaneous 
volatility over the time span [t, t+T]. Using Equation 1, this implies 
(Equation 3) 
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Suppose there are two options of different terms to maturity: a short term 
option with time to expiration T and implied volatilityV , and a long term 
option with time to expiration K, which is n days longer than T (K=T+n) and 
implied volatility V , the following relationship is expected to hold. 
)(TSt
)(KLt
(Equation 4) 
 
  )(*),()( σρθσ −=− StLt VTV  
Where 
)1)((
)1(),( −+
−=
+
T
nT
nT
TT ρ
ρρθ   
 
θ represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long term 
stock options with respect to that of the short-term option. Given a movement in 
the implied volatility of short-term option V , there should be a smaller 
movement in the implied volatility of long-term option V . The exact proportion 
depends on the mean reversion parameter ρ, as well as on the times to expiration 
of the two options. 
S
t
L
t
The model is testable without knowing the long-run mean level of σ  by 
simply running an OLS regression of V against . The coefficient of V  
represents the actual elasticity of the implied volatility of long term option 
contract relative to that of short term one. If the empirical beta is greater than the 
theoretical beta, then the long-term contracts overreact to the short-term contracts. 
L
t
S
tV
S
t
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If the difference between empirical beta and theoretical beta is greater for growth 
portfolio than for value portfolio, then there is a greater degree of overreaction in 
growth portfolio than in value portfolio, or vice versa.  
The main hypothesis to be tested in the paper is that the average variation 
of implied volatility of growth stock options over time is higher than that of the 
value stock options. In particular, implied volatility of growth stock options may 
demonstrate a greater degree of overreaction.  
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
 
Daily option data from July 2000 to December 2002 provided by Prophet 
Financial System, a relatively comprehensive database after Berkley Options 
database became unavailable, are used for the study. The dataset include open 
price, close price, high and low prices, trading volume and open interests for call 
and put contracts of stock options. Daily stock data, interest rates, and accounting 
data are extracted from CRSP and Compustat.  
We restrict the sample to stocks within S&P 100 index to ensure relatively 
active trading of each stock and a continuous time-series of implied volatility for 
analysis. A continuous time series of implied volatility is critical to calculate ρ, 
the autocorrelation coefficient of the implied volatility of short term option series, 
an input for the latter computation of theoretical theta. The theoretical theta will 
not be reliable if ρ is found from a discontinuous time series. In addition, without 
active trading in a stock option, the implied volatility would be constant, which is 
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against the objective of the study, to compare the degree of changes in implied 
volatility between value and growth stocks. S&P 100 stocks meet the criterion of 
the study since they are widely traded and comprise of stocks with various growth 
aspects, which enable us to classify them into growth and value portfolios. In the 
case of any possible non-trading days for certain sample stocks, I delete the 
observation before building the equally weighted implied volatility series of value 
and growth portfolios.  
The finance literature generally classifies value stocks and growth stocks 
according to the earning yield and book-to-market value ratios. Typically, value 
stocks are those whose market price is relatively low in relation to earnings per 
share (Basu 1977), cash flow per share (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994), 
book value per share (Fama and French 1992), and dividends per share (Blume 
1980 and Rozeff 1984). In comparison, growth stocks have been defined as 
having relatively high prices in relation to those same fundamental factors, as well 
as high past rates of growth in EPS.  
However, there was no one variable that appeared to be better than the 
others in identifying value stocks that outperformed the market.  In Lakonishok, 
Schleifer, and Vishny’s (1994) study, price/cash flow appears to be an indicator of 
value that leads to more significant mean difference than price/earnings or 
price/book value. In Bauman, Conover and Miller’s (1998) study, price/book 
value rather than price/earnings, price/cash flow, or dividend yield is the indicator 
of value that reports a more significant mean difference. Fama and French (1998) 
classify value and growth portfolios formed on four measures, book-to-market 
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(B/M), earning to price (E/P), cash flow to price (C/P) and dividend to price ratios 
(D/P) respectively. The value portfolio includes firms whose B/M, E/P, C/P or 
D/P are among the highest 30% for a country, and growth firms include firms in 
the bottom 30%. In this paper, we rank the S&P 100 stocks by their price to 
earning ratio (P/E). The top 30% is classified as growth portfolio, and the bottom 
30% falls into value portfolio. The remaining 40% are eliminated. 
The initial dataset of S&P 100 contains about ten million records over the 
sample period from 2000 to 2002. Eliminating 40% of the initial set, that is 
neither growth nor value stock, we end up with six million observations. Since 
there might be multiple option contracts with different strike prices matured on 
the same day and not all of them contain active trading records, we need to screen 
the dataset and retain one option contract with a relatively large number of 
observations for each sample stock each month and build continuous short term 
and long term series.  The screening criterion is to retain the contracts with the 
least number of observations with the same open price, close price, high price, 
and low price. This enables retaining contracts with active trading for the 
calculation of implied volatility. 
For the purpose of estimating implied volatility, we use the Binomial 
Option Pricing model by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979). It explicitly accounts 
for the dividend yield on the stock option and for the possibility of early exercise 
to calculate the implied volatility. After deriving the implied volatility of 
individual stock, we create two time series for both value and growth portfolios. 
The short term series consists of observations with one day up to one month to 
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expiration. The long term series consists of observations with thirty one days up 
to two months to expiration.   
Moreover, for each time series implied volatility is calculated by 
averaging the implied volatility of call and put contracts near the money.  Then 
we build the equally weighted implied volatility of value or growth portfolios by 
averaging out the implied volatility of all the stocks in value or growth portfolios 
on each day. Eventually we have a total of 648 daily observations for each series 
from July 2000 to December 2002 for analysis. The last step is to derive the 
empirical theta and compare it with theoretical theta. We run OLS regressions of 
 against V for each portfolio and also t tests.  LtV
S
t
 
V. Empirical results 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis of the short term and long term 
series of value and growth portfolios for the full sample period and for each year. 
Mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum implied volatilities 
are reported. The mean and median implied volatilities of growth portfolio are 
overall higher than those of value portfolio for both short term and long term 
series. For the whole time period from 2000 to 2002, the mean short term implied 
volatility of growth portfolio is 48.86%, whereas that of value portfolio is 
39.79%. The mean long term implied volatility is shown to be a bit lower than 
short term one with 47.44% for the growth portfolio and 38.01% for the value 
portfolio.  
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We also compare the level and daily changes of implied volatility of value 
and growth portfolios for both series over the sample period as shown in Chart 1, 
Chart 2, Chart 3, and Chart 4. The daily changes in implied volatility of growth 
portfolios are consistently higher than those of value portfolios throughout the 
sample period from 2000 to 2002. For both portfolios daily changes in implied 
volatility are larger in 2000 and 2001 than in 2002, consistent with the fact that 
stock market got volatile starting early 2000. 
Assuming the stochastic process of implied volatility follows a mean 
reversion process decaying geometrically back to its long-term mean, the serial 
correlation properties of the instantaneous volatility σt are of interest to derive 
theoretical upper bounds for the elasticity of long-term implied volatility with 
respect to short-term implied volatility. The estimates of ρ for value and growth 
portfolios are listed in Table 2. ρ of value portfolio is 0.845, and that of growth 
portfolio is 0.793. They are used in calculating the theoretical beta. The daily 
implied volatility at each lag length is also reported. 
The theoretical theta depends on both the decay parameter ρ and the time 
to expiration T of the short term option series. Thus it varies over a range of 
values. The theoretical thetas for value and growth portfolios as shown in 
Equation 5 are calculated and presented in Table 3. Three ρ values and six 
possible terms to expiration ranging from 5 days to 30 days are used to calculate 
the theoretical theta. As the long term option series in the study has one month 
longer time to expiration than the short term series, the theoretical theta value 
ranges from 0.1768 to 0.5236, getting larger as ρ gets larger given the same time 
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to expiration. For example, when ρ is 0.9 and the short term option contract has 
30 days to expiration, the theoretical value of theta is 0.5212. That is, if the long 
term options of a stock are priced rationally relative to the short term options, then 
when the short term volatility is one point above its mean, the long term implied 
volatility should be at most about 0.5212 percent above its mean.  
Table 4 shows the results of OLS regressions of V against to test 
whether the theoretical theta holds empirically, for the full sample period and for 
each year run separately. For the full sample period, the coefficients of growth 
portfolio and value portfolio are 0.751 and 0.641, higher than the average 
plausible theoretical thetas of 0.3666 and 0.3343 respectively. That is, the long 
term option series overreacts to short term series for both value and growth 
portfolios. The difference between empirical theta and theoretical theta is 0.3844 
for the growth portfolio, and 0.3067 for the value portfolio. The growth investors 
overreact to a greater degree than value investors by 0.0777 during the full sample 
period. For each single year, the coefficients are higher than theoretical values for 
both value and growth portfolios as well. In particular, Growth portfolios appear 
to have a larger difference of thetas than value portfolios. 
L
t
S
tV
 T tests in Table 5 enhance the regression results by comparing daily data 
of the empirical theta with the theoretical theta. The empirical thetas are found 
significantly higher than the theoretical theta for the full sample period as well as 
each single year. Overall, the evidence indicates that growth portfolios overreact 
to a larger extent than the value portfolios, consistent with overreaction as an 
explanation to the value effect.  
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VI. Conclusions 
 
The empirical results from the comparison of the degree of overreactions 
between value and growth portfolios using implied volatility from option prices 
contributes to the existing literature as a support to overreaction as an explanation 
to the value effect. Investors holding different portfolios are fundamentally 
different and have different expectations on the future volatility of the portfolios. 
The findings for the sample period from 2000 to 2002 do indicate a relatively 
large degree of overreactions in growth stocks. This implies that investors are not 
well diversified, and instead overreact more to news for growth stocks than for 
value stocks. Future research is expected to cover the comparison from 1997 up to 
2000 to find out whether the degree of overreaction of growth and value 
portfolios varies across the up and down markets.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Analysis of the Implied Volatility of Short Term and Long 
Term Option Series of Value and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 
2000 to 2002 
 
(S) represents the summary of short term series of option contracts, and (L) represents the summary of long 
term series of option contracts. 
 
 
Sample Period Mean           Median           Standard      Minimum     Maximum 
                Deviation 
 
Value Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample  
(S) 0.3979  0.3855  0.0716  0.1931  0.6785  
  (L) 0.3801  0.3743  0.0663  0.2013  0.5937 
2000   
(S) 0.4075  0.3902  0.0940  0.2128  0.6785 
 (L) 0.4058  0.4133  0.0856  0.2246  0.5937 
2001   
(S) 0.4029  0.4026  0.0696  0.1931  0.5686 
  (L) 0.3783  0.3782  0.0595  0.2013  0.5203 
2002   
(S) 0.3883  0.3756  0.0589  0.2489  0.5874 
  (L) 0.3693  0.3582  0.0583  0.2654  0.5552 
 
 
Growth Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample 
  (S) 0.4886  0.4724  0.0812  0.2493  0.7472 
  (L) 0.4744  0.4638  0.0659  0.2781  0.6751 
2000 
  (S) 0.4752  0.4646  0.0965  0.2493  0.7090 
  (L) 0.4650  0.4588  0.0757  0.2781  0.6751 
2001 
  (S) 0.5188  0.5184  0.0824  0.3430  0.7386 
  (L) 0.5011  0.5012  0.0671  0.3455  0.6555 
2002 
  (S) 0.4649  0.4458  0.0600  0.3356  0.6429 
  (L) 0.4523  0.4359  0.0480  0.3485  0.5685 
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Table 2:  
 
Autocorrelation and Partial Correlation Coefficients for the Implied Volatility of 
Short Term Option Series of Value and Growth Portfolios for the Sample Period 
from 2000 to 2002 
 
Implied daily ρis the autocorrelation raised to the 1/n power, where n is the lag length in days. 
 
Lag length Autocorrelation  Partial Correlation          Implied daily ρ 
(days)          
 
Value Portfolio: 
 
1 0.845 (0.087)  0.845 (0.088)   0.845   
2 0.776 (0.087)  0.215 (0.088)   0.881   
3 0.660 (0.087)  -0.135 (0.088)   0.871   
4 0.595 (0.086)  0.060 (0.088)   0.878   
5 0.548 (0.086)  -0.104 (0.088)   0.886  
6 0.502 (0.086)  -0.005 (0.088)   0.891   
7 0.480 (0.085)  0.060 (0.088)   0.900   
8 0.453 (0.085)  0.340 (0.088)   0.906   
 
Growth Portfolio: 
 
1 0.793 (0.087)   0.793 (0.088)   0.793   
2 0.701 (0.087)   0.197 (0.088)   0.837   
3 0.631 (0.087)   0.081 (0.088)   0.858   
4 0.591 (0.086)   0.092 (0.088)   0.876   
5 0.539 (0.086)   0.011 (0.088)   0.883   
6 0.544 (0.086)  0.152 (0.088)   0.904   
7 0.493 (0.085)   -0.054 (0.088)   0.904   
8 0.476 (0.085)   0.055 (0.088)   0.911   
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Table 3: 
 
Theoretical Value of 
)1)((
)1(),( −+
−=
+
T
nT
nT
TT ρ
ρρθ  
 
θ represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long-term options with respect to that of 
the short term options. ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient of implied volatility of short term options series 
at a one-day lag, T is the time to expiration of the short term option, and the time to expiration of the long 
term option is n days longer than T.  (n=30 days for the Table) 
 
 
T = No. of days  ρ=0.7   ρ=0.8   ρ=0.9   
 
 
5    0.1717   0.2124   0.3401 
 
10    0.2573   0.2800   0.3782 
 
15    0.3349   0.3455   0.4161 
 
20    0.4003   0.4047   0.4530 
 
25    0.4546   0.4563   0.4882 
 
29    0.5000   0.5006   0.5212 
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Table 4:  
 
Regressions of the Long Term Implied Volatility onto the Short Term Implied 
Volatility of Value and Growth Portfolios for the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002 
 
 
 
Sample Period  Coefficient  Standard Error R2 
 
Value Portfolio: 
Full Sample   0.641   0.026   0.479  
2000    0.645   0.047   0.488 
2001    0.620   0.037   0.525 
2002    0.637   0.058   0.421 
Growth Portfolio: 
 
Full Sample   0.751   0.012   0.856 
2000    0.759   0.017   0.938 
2001    0.723   0.024   0.786 
2002    0.731   0.020   0.832 
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Table 5: 
 
One-Sample T-test of Empirical Value of Theta in Comparison with Theoretical 
Value of 
)1)((
)1(),( −+
−=
+
T
nT
nT
TT ρ
ρρθ  for the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002 
 
Theoretical theta below is the average theta value for the corresponding sample period.  
),( Tρθ represents the theoretical elasticity of the implied volatility of long term options with respect to 
that of the short term options. ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient of implied volatility of the short term 
option series at a one-day lag, T is the time to expiration of the short term option, and the time to expiration 
of the long term option is n days longer than T.  
 
 
Sample Period Empirical Theta Theoretical Theta T-Stat       p-value 
      
Value Portfolio: 
   
Full sample   0.641   0.3343  34.770  0.000 
2000    0.645   0.3515  20.165  0.000 
2001    0.620   0.3272  24.758  0.000 
2002    0.637   0.3288  12.006  0.000 
 
 
Growth Portfolio: 
   
Full sample   0.751   0.3666  45.565  0.000 
2000    0.759   0.3768  26.047  0.000 
2001    0.723   0.3612  35.262  0.000 
2002    0.731   0.3669  20.513  0.000 
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Chart 1: A Comparison of the Level of Implied Volatility of Short Term Option Series of Value
and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002
.00
.10
.20
.30
.40
.50
.60
.70
.80
D
A
T
E
3
1
-
J
u
l
-
2
0
0
0
2
8
-
A
u
g
-
2
0
0
0
2
5
-
S
e
p
-
2
0
0
0
2
3
-
O
c
t
-
2
0
0
0
2
0
-
N
o
v
-
2
0
0
0
1
8
-
D
e
c
-
2
0
0
0
1
7
-
J
a
n
-
2
0
0
1
1
4
-
F
e
b
-
2
0
0
1
1
4
-
M
a
r
-
2
0
0
1
1
1
-
A
p
r
-
2
0
0
1
0
9
-
M
a
y
-
2
0
0
1
0
6
-
J
u
n
-
2
0
0
1
0
4
-
J
u
l
-
2
0
0
1
0
2
-
A
u
g
-
2
0
0
1
2
9
-
A
u
g
-
2
0
0
1
2
6
-
S
e
p
-
2
0
0
1
2
4
-
O
c
t
-
2
0
0
1
2
1
-
N
o
v
-
2
0
0
1
1
9
-
D
e
c
-
2
0
0
1
1
9
-
J
a
n
-
2
0
0
2
1
6
-
F
e
b
-
2
0
0
2
1
6
-
M
a
r
-
2
0
0
2
1
2
-
A
p
r
-
2
0
0
2
1
1
-
M
a
y
-
2
0
0
2
0
8
-
J
u
n
-
2
0
0
2
0
6
-
J
u
l
-
2
0
0
2
0
3
-
A
u
g
-
2
0
0
2
3
1
-
A
u
g
-
2
0
0
2
2
7
-
S
e
p
-
2
0
0
2
2
6
-
O
c
t
-
2
0
0
2
2
3
-
N
o
v
-
2
0
0
2
2
1
-
D
e
c
-
2
0
0
2
Date
I
m
p
l
i
e
d
 
V
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
Value-S
Growth-S
Chart 2: A Comparison of the Level of Implied Volatility of Long Term Option Series of Value
and Growth Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002
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Chart 3: A Comparison of Daily Changes in Short Term Implied Volatility of value and Growth 
Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002
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Chart 4: A Comparison of Daily Changes in Long Term Implied Volatility of Value and Growth 
Portfolios over the Sample Period from 2000 to 2002 
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